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Encouraging Innovation in Business Relationships—A Research Note 
Abstract 
 
How do buyer-supplier relationships affect innovation? This study suggests that the 
relational exchange norms flexibility, information sharing, and solidarity (the bright side) 
encourage buyer innovation. However, negative (dark side) aspects of relationships with 
suppliers – loss of supplier objectivity, increasing buyer expectations, and supplier opportunism 
– may accompany the bright side and subsequently reduce buyer innovation. The study reports 
on the simultaneous effects of the bright and dark sides on innovation and the resultant effect on 
supplier performance as evaluated from the buyer’s perspective. Using data from the travel and 
computer industry, regression models reveal that the bright side encourages buyer innovation. 
Buyers reciprocate this support by enhancing their supplier evaluations. The findings indicate 
that rising buyer expectations – supposedly a dark side of relational exchange – encourage 
innovation, while loss of supplier objectivity reduces relationship performance. These findings 
imply that the bright and dark sides are not mutually exclusive dimensions of good versus bad 
behavior. 
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Introduction 
 
Observation from practice suggests that building relationships helps innovation. For 
example, von Hippel (1988) finds that in certain industries most innovations originate from 
suppliers’ ideas and suggestions. How buyer-supplier relationships actually encourage buyer 
innovation has received little attention. This is surprising, as innovation is a valuable benefit for 
the buyer, going beyond prices and products. Following Strutton, Pelton, and Lumpkin’s 
definition (1993), innovation is the encouragement of improvement by the supplier with regard 
to how the buyer solves problems, develops ideas, and thinks of (process) improvements. For 
example, in the travel industry, several airlines, hotels, and car rental companies have 
encouraged travel agents to develop innovations, such as dynamic packaging, which expedite 
new travel package creation (http://www.ettsa.eu). 
Innovation is important to buyers, as greater innovation helps them adapt to changing 
environments and develop competitive advantages (Hurley and Hult, 1998). The present study 
demonstrates that when suppliers encourage buyer innovation, the buyer reciprocates this support 
by evaluating the relationship with the supplier more positively. This reciprocity suggests a route 
that suppliers could take to increase their buyer ratings and to strengthen their position. 
This study links innovation to relational exchange norms, defined as shared expectations 
about supplier behavior (Heide and John, 1992). These relational exchange norms, labeled the 
bright side, complement potentially negative aspects of relationships (the dark side). This dark 
side consists of rising buyer expectations, loss of supplier objectivity, and supplier opportunism 
(Grayson and Ambler, 1999). Dark side variables are complements to norms, but not norms 
themselves as they are not necessarily shared expectations. Different from previous research, this 
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paper investigates if relational exchange norms and the dark side represent mutually exclusive 
dimensions of good versus bad behavior within relationships as some argue for, or if the dark 
side is also present in relationships where relational exchange norms are well developed (Heide 
and John 1992).  
Theoretical Development 
 
This study takes the perspective of the buyer in a vertical exchange relationship with its 
supplier. The buyer reports on its relationship with this supplier, how the supplier encourages 
innovation, and how the supplier performs within the relationship. The study draws upon the 
relational exchange literature, which forms the basis for scholars’ study of exchanges between 
firms (Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990; Heide and John, 1992; Lusch and Brown, 1996). 
Adding a dark side allows to take a balanced perspective towards relational exchange norms, as 
there is evidence that if relational exchange norms are present to a high degree, performance may 
suffer (Grayson and Ambler, 1999). This study therefore includes the direct effects of the dark 
side on relationship performance, as the dashed line in Figure 1 indicates. Relational exchange 
norms and dark side perspectives thus subsequently explain innovation and supplier performance 
(as rated by the buyer). Including supplier performance helps determine if the buyer reciprocates 
the supplier encouraging innovation. The key to the proposed model (see Figure 1) is the 
expectation that relational exchange norms encourage buyer innovation while the dark side 
factors discourage this innovation. Moreover, the model suggests that relational exchange norms 
do not directly affect performance, but that relationship performance increases if these exchange 
norms provide a benefit to buyers through innovation (i.e., a mediating model). This study uses 
the innovation literature to establish innovation as a critical mediator that enhances performance 
(Strutton, Pelton, and Lumpkin, 1993; Hurley and Hult, 1998). 
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Figure 1 about here 
 
The influence of the bright side on innovation 
The bright side norms comprise flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity (Lusch 
and Brown, 1996; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Bercovitz, Jap, and Nickerson, 2006). Flexibility in 
relationships is the expectancy that parties are willing to make adjustments according to 
changing circumstances (Heide and John, 1992). If flexibility is present, parties can learn from 
past successes and can create the culture to be innovative (Hurley and Hult, 1998). Previous 
research has suggested that flexibility reflects innovation (Strutton, Pelton, and Lumpkin, 1993). 
However, parties’ willingness to make adjustments within a relationship (i.e., display flexibility) 
is a prerequisite, but not a motive for innovation. This suggests that flexibility and innovation are 
distinct variables. Information exchange is the free exchange of information, even if the party 
providing information does not benefit directly. Information exchange can increase the creativity 
to develop new products or services (Moorman and Miner, 1997), because collaboration provides 
access to suggestions for improvement, information, and resources that a firm cannot generate 
internally. In addition, information exchange facilitates learning, which is an important 
antecedent of innovation (Hurley and Hult, 1998). Finally, solidarity refers to a norm with which 
to jointly solve individual and common problems (Lusch and Brown, 1996). Solidarity increases 
one party’s interest in the welfare of the other and promotes a long-term orientation (Bercovitz, 
Jap, and Nickerson, 2006). Suggesting potential innovations is a way of expressing concern for 
the other party’s welfare. Solidarity also reduces conflict, thereby stimulating a climate in which 
suppliers can suggest improvements rather than resorting to politicizing or bargaining. 
5 
 
This study suggests that, through innovation, the bright side of relationships impacts 
relationship performance indirectly. This suggestion reflects the notion that exchange norms are 
not of immediate value per se, but that the way in which they impact how buyers innovate (and 
sellers encourage them to do so) allow these norms to enhance performance. The logic behind 
this is that, ceteris paribus, developing relational exchange norms carries costs that reduce 
performance. Only if these relational exchange norms allow buyers and suppliers to deal more 
effectively with the environment through innovation, are relational exchange norms’ advantages 
likely to outweigh the costs of developing the norms. Therefore: 
 
H1: The higher the level of (a) flexibility, (b) information exchange, and (c) solidarity in 
a buyer-supplier relationship, the more the supplier encourages the buyer to innovate. 
 
The influence of the dark side on innovation 
Williamson (1975) suggested many years ago that a dark side consisting of opportunism 
is present in relationships. Nevertheless, subsequent research on buyer-supplier relationships 
mostly ignored the dark side. More recent work by Grayson and Ambler (1999) expanded the 
dark side concept beyond opportunism to include increasing buyer expectations and the loss of 
supplier objectivity. Collectively, these authors refer to these mentioned issues as relationships’ 
dark side. These dark side aspects could reduce innovation because they diminish exchange 
partners’ involvement and interaction, which are key to encouraging innovation (Grayson and 
Ambler, 1999). 
Rising buyer expectations mean that, in the dynamics of a relationship, buyers increase 
the standards to which they hold the products and services provided by the supplier. Gruen, 
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Summers, and Acito (2000) suggest that as relationships progress, buyers become focused on 
short-term outcomes and start to expect more from the supplier. Doyle, Korstjens, and Mitchell 
(1980) and Mitchell and Sanders (1995) ascertain that, over a long time span, suppliers have 
difficulty offering buyers innovations that meet their demands. As relationships develop, buyers 
that hold suppliers to increasingly higher standards may become problematic. Increasing 
expectations among buyers will, ceteris paribus, reduce satisfaction with a relationship with the 
supplier because of a greater discrepancy between the products and services offered and the 
buyer’s expectations. Because dissatisfaction may result when the supplier does not meet the 
buyers’ expectations, suppliers may refrain from encouraging buyers to innovate as this 
complicates meeting expectations. Moreover, when an exchange partner becomes less satisfied 
with the relationship, conflict increases and trust erodes (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 1999). These 
conditions likely reduce innovation. Reductions in trust also lead to fewer investments in the 
relationship (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999) that are necessary to redevelop the relationship 
through innovation. Hence: 
 
H2: The higher the buyer’s expectation regarding its supplier, the less the supplier 
encourages the buyer to innovate. 
 
Loss of supplier objectivity occurs when suppliers become stale and do not adapt to the 
perspectives of buyers sufficiently (Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande, 1992; Grayson and 
Ambler, 1999). Thus, rather than suppliers relating to buyers’ needs, they continue to offer the 
same services as they had in the past. Firms that do not relate well to buyers’ needs are less 
market oriented. In turn, a lower market orientation decreases innovation (Han, Kim, and 
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Srivastava, 1998), because less interfunctional coordination (key to market orientation) reduces 
creativity and risk taking, while less focus on competitors decreases suppliers’ desire to 
introduce distinct innovations on the market, and less focus on buyers means being less aware of 
changing needs. Moreover, in relationships characterized by a feeling that the supplier cannot be 
objective, the buyer may want to terminate the relationship (Mitchell and Sanders, 1995). 
Suppliers could stop encouraging relationship when they expect that the buyer may terminate the 
relationship. Thus: 
 
H3: The more the buyer perceives a supplier’s loss of objectivity, the less the buyer feels 
encouraged to innovate. 
 
Supplier opportunism is a negative aspect arising in relationships (Heide, Wathne, and 
Rokkan, 2007). Much of the previous research has focused on how opportunism creates trading 
difficulties (Wathne and Heide, 2000). This opportunism is self-interest seeking with guile 
(Williamson, 1975), with guile defined as taking advantage of opportunities with little regard for 
principles or consequences. Generally, scholars believe that opportunism has a negative impact 
on buyers (Hawkins, Wittmann, and Beyerlein, 2008) and that this negativity manifests itself 
through shirking or evading obligations (Wathne and Heide, 2000). If opportunism is present, 
buyers or suppliers will hold back from the relationship, reducing the openness required to 
encourage innovation. Specifically, when supplier opportunism concerns emerge, buyers become 
less willing to invest in relationships, thus undermining buyer innovation (Wathne and Heide, 
2000). Moreover, opportunism may also encompass a refusal to adapt to new circumstances, 
suggesting a decrease in innovation (Wathne and Heide, 2000). Hence: 
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H4: The higher the level of supplier opportunism in a buyer-supplier relationship, the less 
the buyer feels encouraged to innovate. 
Innovation and Relationship Performance 
 
This study adopts a broad conceptualization of innovation that focuses on encouraging 
improvement by finding new ways to do things. This type of innovation should enhance 
relationship performance because the ability to improve allows relationships to redevelop and 
adjust to changing circumstances (Han, Kim, and Srivastava, 1998). Innovation allows firms to 
get rid of old work processes and replace them with more effective and efficient processes. The 
population ecology literature therefore suggests that firms that adapt to their environments have a 
higher survival rate. Previous research also suggests a robust relationship between innovation 
and performance (Han, Kim, and Srivastava, 1998). Therefore: 
 
H5: Innovation improves how buyers evaluate relationship performance with their 
suppliers. 
 
Research Method 
 
Context 
 
The empirical context comprises travel agents and tour operators (SIC codes 4724 and 
4725) and firms active in computer production and wholesaling (SIC codes 5045 and 3571) in 
the Netherlands. The first industry provides mostly services and the second mostly goods. Table 
2 shows the sample’s descriptive statistics. 
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The data are collected by drawing all addresses in the mentioned industries from the 
Chamber of Commerce database, which includes all economically active firms. This resulted in a 
sampling frame of 458 travel agents and tour operators and 325 firms in the computer production 
and wholesaling sector. The researchers contacted all firms and asked them to participate, 
provide details of a key informant, and to provide up-to-date contact information. 
Data Collecting Procedure 
 
Based on interviews conducted prior to the survey, the director/CEO appeared to be the 
most suitable small company informant, and the marketing or sales manager the most suitable 
large company informant. This paper adopted the suggestions of  Kumar, Stern, and Anderson 
(1993) to check the global and specific informant competency. 
The informants filled out a series of questions, keeping a relationship in mind that is 
important to them. They therefore report on relationships that are salient to the buyers, likely 
increasing the measures’ validity. For travel agents, these relationships are with key suppliers 
such as airlines (e.g., Air France-KLM) and hotel chains (e.g., Marriott). For the computer 
production and wholesale sector, the relationships are with memory suppliers (e.g., Kingston) 
and peripheral suppliers (e.g., Logitech). 
Data are collected using mail surveys and adopting Dillman’s (2000) procedure. 207 
usable responses were received (travel sector: n=113, 25% response rate; computer sector: n=94; 
29% response rate). 
Nonresponse bias was assessed by testing if the surveyed industries’ populations differ 
significantly from the sample. No significant differences were found between the sample and 
population, leading to the conclusion that the sample is representative of the population. 
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Measurement 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of all the measurement items, as well as the Cronbach 
Alpha for reflective constructs with three or more items. Table 2 includes the correlations and 
summary statistics related to the constructs discussed below. 
 
Table 1 here 
Table 2 here 
 
Endogenous variables: 
Relationship performance: is measured on the basis of Kumar, Stern, and Achrol (1992). 
The adopted scale measures the evaluation of supplier performance from the buyer’s perspective. 
This supplier performance is relative to expectations and how successful the association with the 
supplier has been. Kumar, Stern, and Achrol (1992) demonstrate that this measure is highly 
correlated with financial performance and is well suited to compare performance across different 
firms. Many studies on relationships use this global measure as a dependent variable (e.g., Jap 
and Ganesan, 2000; Jap and Anderson, 2003), thus allowing comparisons. 
Innovation: is the supplier’s encouragement of improvement regarding how the buyer 
solves problems, develops ideas, and thinks of (process) improvements. The measure builds on 
the one that Strutton, Pelton, and Lumpkin (1993) developed. This broad innovation measure 
focuses on the organizational challenge to find better work methods, and therefore differs from 
innovation measures that focus on new product adoption (Hauser, Tellis, and Griffin, 2006). 
Furthermore, the definition is not restricted to technological change but includes new 
administrative, operative, and management ideas or processes. This definition of innovation 
11 
 
works well when used in different contexts, as is the case here. Introducing distinct new products 
on the market is particularly rare in the travel industry, but there are frequently improvements in 
the process of making services available. Note that the adopted definition does not imply the 
innovation to be absolutely novel, only novel relative to the organization (i.e., the buyer). 
Exogenous variables: 
Flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity: The scales used to measure flexibility, 
information exchange, and solidarity originate from Heide and John (1992) and Lusch and 
Brown (1996). This measure taps into the degree to which the buyer perceives shared norms in 
the buyer-supplier relationship. 
Rising buyer expectations, loss of objectivity, and opportunism: Rising buyer 
expectations are increasing standards of the buyer with regard to the products/services provided 
by the supplier. Loss of objectivity refers to suppliers that keep offering similar services and 
products, regardless of changing buyer needs. Opportunism is defined as interest seeking with 
guile (Williamson, 1975). All dark side measures originate from Grayson and Ambler (1999). 
Validation of Measures 
 
A confirmatory factor analysis assessed the indicators’ fit with the constructs studied. 
The model fit is adequate. The χ2 value obtained is 405.66 at 231 degrees of freedom (p<.01). 
The comparative fit index is .97, and the RMSEA is .06. 
Consistent with theoretical expectations, the correlations of the latent bright side 
constructs are high, although these correlations are substantially below unity, which supports the 
discriminant validity of the bright side factors. The Fornell-Larcker test (1981) ascertained the 
discriminant validity by comparing the variance extracted from each pair of constructs (with the 
exception of the formative opportunism construct) to the two constructs’ squared correlation. 
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Since the variance extracted exceeded the squared correlation of the constructs in every case, the 
results indicate discriminant validity. Table 2 shows the average variances extracted on the 
diagonal. 
The calculated Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients range from .71 to .91. Loss of objectivity 
has two items correlated -.44. Rising expectations has two items correlated .52. Finally, 
Harman’s one factor test suggests that common method bias is not a problem. 
Results 
 
 
This study uses ordinary least squares to estimate the regression models. Both models are 
significant. The model explaining innovation has an R2 of .37, while the model explaining 
relationship performance has an R2 of .29. Table 3 includes details on the model fit and the 
significance of the various parameters. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
 
Model 1 in Table 3 suggests that relational exchange norms enhance innovation. More 
specifically, flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity positively relate to innovation 
(T=2.98, 2.14, and 4.32 respectively). These results support Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c. 
With regard to the dark side variables, the findings are mixed. Hypothesis 2 is not 
supported, and the findings indicate that rising buyer expectations enhance, rather than reduce, 
innovation (B=.13, T=2.20). Hypothesis 3 states that a loss of objectivity reduces innovation, but 
the findings suggest no significant link (B=-.07, T=-1.18). Loss of objectivity, however, does 
reduce relationship performance (B=-.28, T=-4.90). Hypothesis 4 states a negative association 
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between opportunism and innovation. The model rejects this hypothesis (B=-.01, T=-.15) but 
supports Hypothesis 5, which states that innovation increases relationship performance (B=.34, 
T=5.52). 
This study follows Baron and Kenny (1986) to test for mediating effects. The findings 
suggest that innovation partially mediates information exchange and solidarity’s effects on 
relationship performance. Innovation fully mediates flexibility’s effect on relationship 
performance. The percentage of effects mediated is 50%, 48%, and 64% respectively. For 
completeness, this study tests for possible mediating effects between the dark side constructs and 
relationship performance. The findings support innovation fully mediating the effect of 
increasing buyer expectations (60%), but establish only partial mediation for loss of objectivity 
(24%). 
Discussion 
 
The objective of this study is to investigate how the relationship between buyers and 
suppliers affect the extent to which suppliers encourage buyers to innovate, and how this 
subsequently affects buyers’ perception of the relationship performance. The findings indicate 
that innovation has a mediating effect between the bright side of relations and relationship 
performance. This novel finding suggests that suppliers investing in building relationship norms 
with their buyers may see this reciprocated by their buyers’ better performance evaluations 
because these buyers feel encouraged to innovate. Including innovation as a mediator may also 
explain why previous studies exploring the impact of relational exchange norms on relationship 
performance obtained mixed results.  
Owing to enhanced innovation, developing relational norms appears positive to both 
buyers and suppliers (as suppliers’ evaluations by buyers becomes more positive), but a dark side 
14 
 
complements relational norms. This study presents novel findings on their effect in relation to 
previously established positive effects of relationship bright side factors on relationship 
performance. In particular, loss of objectivity among suppliers in a relationship reduces their 
buyers’ evaluation of relationship performance. Surprisingly, loss of objectivity seems to have no 
effect on innovation but only on performance. An explanation could be that a loss of objectivity 
causes a misfit between needs and wants, which does not affect the encouragement of 
innovation, but does affect how the resulting innovations align with the needs.  
Interestingly, buyer expectations appear to encourage rather than reduce innovation. One 
possible explanation may be that if a buyer expects more of a supplier over time, the supplier 
needs to encourage innovation or face losing a relationship. This suggests that increasing 
expectations may not be the dark side construct as previously assumed.  
There seems to be no significant relationship between opportunism, innovation, and 
relationship performance. A possible explanation is that the presence of relational exchange 
norms reduces opportunism (the correlations in Table 2 appear to support this) and that 
opportunism is an exception in the presence of relatively high relational exchange norms (Heide 
and John, 1992). Additionally, Joshi and Arnold (1997) argue that, in dependent relationships, 
the presence of relational norms reduces opportunism. 
Previous studies suggest that in longer lasting relationships, dark side aspects are less 
important because the parties terminate non-functioning relationships (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh, 
1987). The findings from this paper suggest differently. Firstly, empirically, the bright and dark 
side variables appear to be present in similar levels in shorter and longer lasting relationships. 
Secondly, loss of objectivity appears to have a highly significant effect on relationship 
performance, suggesting that this dark side effect continues to exist in relationships and affect 
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relationship performance. These findings imply that relational exchange norms and the dark side 
coexist rather than representing mutually exclusive dimensions of good versus bad behavior as 
suggested previously (Heide and John, 1992). 
Managerial Implications 
 
This study suggests that suppliers that encourage their buyers to innovate reap the 
benefits of doing so through an enhanced buyer evaluation of their relationship. This 
understanding thus adds to previous research on the performance implications of buyer-supplier 
relationships by showing that there is a payoff for suppliers if they encourage buyers to innovate. 
Suppliers can encourage innovation by exchanging information with buyers, even if this does not 
directly benefit suppliers. The supplier’s encouragement sends the buyer a signal that its supplier 
has the relationship’s interest in mind. Furthermore, showing the other party that any problem 
arising in the relationship is a joint problem, and that the responsibility for the relationship’s 
success lies with both parties, stimulates innovation due to enhanced solidarity. Flexibility 
increases if the parties respond to the requests for changes in the relationship, which also benefits 
innovation.  
The finding that a dark side complements information exchange, solidarity, and 
flexibility has several implications for suppliers. A loss of supplier objectivity reduces buyer 
evaluations and implies that suppliers need to stay alert, offering products and services that relate 
to buyers’ needs, rather than providing products and services that buyers are willing to buy. 
Surprisingly, the results indicate that increasing buyer expectations may actually encourage 
buyer innovation. This suggests that, as buyers’ expectations increase over time, suppliers are 
likely to strive to meet this by encouraging buyer innovation. For suppliers this implies that 
encouraging innovation can be a valuable way to address their customers’ increasingly higher 
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expectations, thus offering such suppliers an important alternative to competing on price and 
product only. 
Limitations 
 
Like most other studies focusing on relationships, the focus here is only on the buyer. 
The supplier’s perspective could differ from that of the buyer. For example, when a buyer uses 
coercive strategies to stimulate the supplier to encourage innovation, the buyer may evaluate the 
outcome positively, but not the supplier. Another limitation is the reliance on only two items for 
two of the dark side variables. Without further assumptions, a confirmatory factor analysis using 
structural equation modeling cannot identify measures when less than three items are available. 
Further, the results may not be generalizable to other contexts despite efforts to test the 
hypotheses in two different industries. Idiosyncrasies in industries and firms may lead to 
different findings. 
Finally, although scholars use the adopted performance measure frequently, the measure 
relates to a buyer-perceived level of supplier performance and is not an objectively or 
independently verifiable measure of performance. 
Issues for Further Research 
 
A number of interesting issues for further research arise from this study. Up to now, little 
research includes relationships’ dark side aspects. Consequently, academics and practitioners 
know little about dark side variables’ dynamics and the circumstances under which they occur. 
Subsequent research may help reveal if, and how, firms attempt to deal with these dark side 
variables as relationships mature. In addition, this study provides opportunities to identify new 
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types of dark side variables within relational, transactional, or contractual exchange. For 
example, relationship maintenance costs may increase over time. 
Another interesting avenue for further research is the degree to which the findings hold in 
uncertain or turbulent market environments. Dark side variables may play different roles in 
uncertain or turbulent markets, as innovation is highly important in these contexts. 
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Table 1: Measurement Scales 
 
Construct Items Cronbach 
Alpha 
Relationship 
performance 
The association with this supplier has been a highly successful one. .90 
If we had to give a performance appraisal for the past year, it would be very good.  
The supplier leaves nothing to be desired from a performance standpoint.  
Taking all the different factors into account the supplier’s performance has been 
excellent. 
 
Generally the results of the relationship with the supplier exceeded our expectations.  
   
Innovation Our supplier encourages us to find new ways around old problems .86 
Our supplier encourages us to develop own ideas.  
Our supplier encourages us to improve upon our methods  
Our supplier talks up new ways of doing things.  
Our supplier likes us to try new ways of doing things.  
   
Flexibility Flexibility in response to requests for changes is a characteristic of this relationship. .71 
Changes in terms are not ruled out by both parties if considered necessary. 
We expect to make adjustments in the ongoing relationship to cope with changing 
circumstances. 
 
   
Information 
exchange 
In this relationship, it is expected that any information that might help the other party 
will be provided to them. 
.80 
Exchange of information In this relationship takes place frequently and informally.  
It is expected that the parties will provide proprietary information if it can help the 
other party. 
 
It is expected that we keep each other informed about events or changes that may 
affect the other party. 
 
   
Solidarity Problems that arise in the course of this relationship are treated by the parties as joint 
rather than individual responsibilities. 
.80 
The parties are committed to improvements that may benefit the relationship as a 
whole and not only the individual parties. 
 
The responsibility for making sure that the relationship works for both of us is a 
shared responsibility. 
 
   
Rising buyer 
expectations 
The more we work with this supplier, the higher our expectations become. - 
We hold our supplier to higher standards than we did when we first began working 
together. 
 
   
Loss of 
objectivity 
This supplier is able to be objective. (reversed) - 
It would be useful to work with a new supplier, just to get a fresh perspective.  
   
Supplier 
opportunism 
Our supplier makes his work easier by relying on ideas and strategies that have 
already been successful with us. 
formative 
Once our supplier knows what we are looking for they will provide it even if they 
know it differs from what they believe is right. 
 
Because this supplier already has a working relationship with us, they think it is all 
right to get away with things that would otherwise be unacceptable. 
 
All scales use seven-point Likert scales ranging from completely disagree to completely agree. 
 
21 
 
Table 2: Correlations and Summary Statistics 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1.  Relationship performance .77a
2.  Encouragement of innovation .45 .69
3.  Flexibility .28 .44 .85
4.  Information exchange .31 .41 .42 .59
5.  Solidarity .38 .53 .48 .45 .71
6.  Rising buyer expectations .23 .33 .25 .23 .33 .70
7.  Loss of supplier objectivity -.40 -.26 -.18 -.23 -.30 -.21 .64
8.  Supplier opportunism -.03 -.06 -.05 -.01 -.10 .05 .18 -
Mean 4.83 4.24 5.13 5.43 4.98 4.99 3.86 3.92
Standard deviation 1.15 1.21 1.03 1.04 1.22 1.24 1.28 1.01
Other sample descriptors Travel agents and tour operators Computer production and 
wholesaling 
Number of employees  1-10 (67%), 11-100 (29%), 101 or more (4%) 1-10 (33%), 11-100 (56%), 101 or 
more (11%) 
Length of relationship with supplier Average=11.68, standard deviation=9.38 Average=7.29, standard deviation=5.11
Position of informant CEO/director (64%), marketing/sales manager (19%), 
other title (17%) 
CEO/director (50%), marketing/sales 
manager (27%), other title (23%) 
a: Values on the diagonal are average variances extracted. 
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Table 3: Results 
 
Parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses 
Model 1 Hypothesis and expected sign 
Dependent: Innovation (R2=.37) 
Constant 
  
.30(.61)
 
Flexibility + (H1) .23(.08) *** 
Information exchange + (H2) .16(.08) ** 
Solidarity + (H3) .30(.07) *** 
Rising buyer expectations - (H4) .13(.06) ** 
Loss of supplier objectivity - (H5) -.07(.06)  
Supplier opportunism - (H6) -.01(.07)  
Model 2  
Dependent: Relationship performance (R2=.29) 
Constant  4.09(.49) *** 
Innovation + (H7) .34(.06) *** 
Rising buyer expectations No hypothesis .04(.06)  
Loss of supplier objectivity No hypothesis -.28(.06) *** 
Supplier opportunism No hypothesis .05(.07)  
*p<.10  
**p<.05  
***p<.01  
Tests are two-tailed, N=207 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
 
 Values on the diagonal are average variances extracted 
Correlations are Pearson correlations for N=207 
   
Dark side factors  
 
Rising buyer expectations (-, H4) 
Loss of supplier objectivity (-, H5) 
Supplier opportunism (-, H6) 
  
Relationship 
performance  
Innovation (+, H7) 
 
Hypothesized 
Included but not 
hypothesized 
Bright s de f ctors 
 
Flexibility (+, H1) 
Information exchange (+, H2) 
Solidarity (+, H3) 
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